

CIA/OCI/BRIEF 141-75
10 SEPTEMBER 1975

Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010043-2

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EAST ASIA BRIEF 141-75.4

CAMBODIA: PHNOM PENH GAVE PRINCE SIHANOUK AND HIS PARTY A FESTIVE WELCOME WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN THE CAMBODIAN CAPITAL TUESDAY.4

THE PRINCE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER KHIEU SAMPHAN. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE SON SEN DELIVERED THE WELCOMING ADDRESS.4

THE KHMER COMMUNISTS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR SOME TIME TO ENTICE SIHANOUK TO RETURN. THE INVITATION, TENDERED TO THE PRINCE WHEN HE WAS IN PYONGYANG IN MID-JULY, EVIDENTLY WAS NOT THE FIRST ONE OFFERED HIM. ALTHOUGH SIHANOUK HAS DUTIFULLY SERVED AS A MOUTHPIECE FOR THE COMMUNISTS SINCE THEIR TAKE-OVER IN MID-APRIL, THE CAMBODIAN LEADERSHIP IS WELL AWARE OF HIS RECORD OF UNPREDICTABLE BEHAVIOR AND PROBABLY WANTS TO HAVE MORE CONTROL OVER HIS ACTIONS.4

THE PRINCE'S CURRENT VISIT TO PHNOM PENH WILL BE SHORT. HE WILL RETURN TO CHINA TO ATTEND THE NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS ON OCTOBER 1, THEN TRAVEL TO NEW YORK TO ADDRESS THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. FROM NEW YORK, HE WILL GO TO PYONGYANG FOR THE

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ANNIVERSARY OF THE KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY ON OCTOBER 10, AND FINALLY
 RETURN TO PEKING TO COMMEMORATE HIS BIRTHDAY ON OCTOBER 31.
 FOLLOWING THIS ROUND OF TRAVEL, SIHANOUK MAY BE RESIGNED TO
 SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME IN PHNOM PENH.4

THE COMMUNISTS APPEAR TO HAVE ASSUAGED THE PRINCE'S EARLIER
 FEARS FOR HIS PERSONAL SAFETY. NEVERTHELESS, HE KNOWS THAT, ONCE
 BACK IN PHNOM PENH, HIS FUTURE ROLE AND LIFE STYLE WILL BE
 DETERMINED BY THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP.4

SIHANOUK'S DECISION TO RETURN TO THE INHOSPITABLE POLITICAL
 CONDITIONS IN PHNOM PENH WAS A DIFFICULT ONE, BUT HE APPARENTLY
 DECIDED THAT THE TRAPPINGS OF HIGH OFFICE, AT LEAST FOR A WHILE,
 ARE BETTER THAN OBSCURE RETIREMENT ABROAD. HE HAS, IN FACT,
 LITTLE LEVERAGE IN DEALING WITH THE KHMER COMMUNISTS.4

THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA MAY HAVE BEEN ABOARD
 THE AIRCRAFT CARRYING SIHANOUK TO PHNOM PENH. A PRESS REPORT
 QUOTING DIPLOMATIC SOURCES IN PEKING SAID HE WOULD BE, BUT PHNOM
 PENH DID NOT ANNOUNCE THE AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL. IF THE CHINESE
 ENVOY DID COME, HE WOULD BE THE FIRST FOREIGN AMBASSADOR TO BE

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ALLOWED BACK IN PHNOM PENH SINCE THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER.

AT ANY RATE, PEKING APPEARS TO HAVE CEMENTED ITS TIES WITH THE
KHMER COMMUNISTS.

THE CHINESE HAVE CONTINUALLY ACCORDED SIHANOUK CORRECT
AND SOMETIMES EVEN LAVISH TREATMENT. AT A FAREWELL BANQUET ON
SEPTEMBER 6, VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-PING EXPRESSED HIS "SINCERE
WISH" THAT SIHANOUK AND PRIME MINISTER PENN NOUTH WOULD CONTINUE
THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATIONAL UNITY AND DEVELOPMENT. THE
CHINESE ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE NOT PUSHED HARD FOR A SIGNIFICANT
POLITICAL ROLE FOR SIHANOUK, HOWEVER, OUT OF FEAR OF
ANTAGONIZING THEIR KHMER COMMUNIST FRIENDS. INDEED, THEY
PROBABLY REGARDED HIS CONTINUED RESIDENCE IN CHINA AS AN
EMBARRASSMENT. {SECRET} E-2 IMPDET.H

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MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 141-75.4

1. LEBANON: CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE IN BOTH TRIPOLI AND ZAGHARTA, AND THE 2,000-3,000 MILITIAMEN ON EACH SIDE HAVE NOW ABANDONED COMBAT AT CLOSE QUARTERS AND RETURNED TO THEIR USUAL TACTIC OF SHELLING FROM FIXED POSITIONS.4

THE MILITIA OF THE RIGHT-WING PHALANGES PARTY, WHICH PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE VIOLENCE IN BEIRUT EARLIER THIS YEAR, HAS NOT BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE LATEST FIGHTING. THE PARTY, LEBANON'S LARGEST CHRISTIAN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, IS NOT STRONG IN THE AREA WHERE THE FIGHTING IS TAKING PLACE.4

THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS ARE ALSO STAYING ON THE SIDELINES, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF SOME 16,000 PALESTINIANS IN TWO REFUGEE CAMPS NEAR TRIPOLI.4

ALTHOUGH THE LEBANESE SECURITY SERVICE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED ITS INABILITY TO STOP THE FIGHTING, THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO RESIST CALLING IN THE ARMY. KAMAL JUMBLATT, LEADER OF THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY, HAS WARNED PRIME MINISTER KARAMI

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AGAINST USING THE ARMY, AND LEADERS OF BEIRUT'S MUSLIM
 COMMUNITY HAVE PREDICTED CIVIL WAR IF THE ARMY BECOMES
 INVOLVED.4

THE CABINET MET FOR THE SECOND TIME IN TWO DAYS TUESDAY.
 FOLLOWING THE MEETING, KARAMI SAID "MEASURES" HAD BEEN
 DECIDED UPON AND WOULD BE ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY. NEWSPAPERS IN BEIRUT
 REPORTED ~~THE~~ ^{WEDNESDAY} MORNING THAT THE ARMY WOULD BE ORDERED ~~TODAY~~ ^{WEDNESDAY} TO
 INTERVENE IN THE FIGHTING. THEY SAID THAT THE CABINET ON
 TUESDAY HAD AGREED TO GIVE ARMY COMMANDER ISKANDAR GHANIM A
 SIX-MONTH LEAVE OF ABSENCE.4

GHANIM ~~BE~~MIGHT BE REPLACED BY ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF NASRALLAH,
 A DRUZE, WHO WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES IN THE PRESENT
 DISPUTE. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS ARMY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF JULES
 BUSTANI, WHO HAS IN THE PAST SERVED IN A LIAISON CAPACITY
 BETWEEN THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN. HE IS A CHRISTIAN,
 BUT HE WOULD BE MUCH LESS OBJECTIONABLE TO MUSLIMS THAN
 GHANIM. {SECRET}4

2. ANGOLA: THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA

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HAS FORCED THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA FROM
 ITS STRONGHOLD AT CAXITO, SOME 40 MILES NORTHEAST OF LUANDA.4

THE FALL OF CAXITO IS A SERIOUS MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEFEAT
 FOR THE NATIONAL FRONT AND MAY BE THE PRELUDE TO A MAJOR OFFENSIVE
 BY THE POPULAR MOVEMENT TO PUSH THE FRONT OUT OF ANGOLA ENTIRELY.4

UNTIL NOW THE FRONT HAS CAPITALIZED ON ITS PRESENCE IN
 CAXITO IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY CREDIBILITY AFTER BEING
 FORCED OUT OF LUANDA IN JULY AND TO DISCREDIT THE POPULAR
 MOVEMENT'S CLAIMS THAT IT IS THE ONLY LIBERATION GROUP CAPABLE
 OF ASSUMING POWER ON INDEPENDENCE DAY, NOVEMBER 11. THE TWO
 GROUPS HAVE BEEN SKIRMISHING SPORADICALLY BETWEEN LUANDA AND
 CAXITO FOR SOME TIME, AND THE FRONT LAST WEEK CLAIMED TO HAVE
 ADVANCED TO WITHIN TEN MILES OF THE CAPITAL.4

UNLESS THE FRONT CAN STAGE A DRAMATIC COMEBACK IN THE VERY
 NEAR FUTURE, IT RUNS THE RISK OF BEING ENTIRELY DISCREDITED AND
 LOSING ANY CHANCE OF BEING CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL PARTICIPANT
 IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE GOVERNMENT. {SECRET} E-2 IMPDET.4

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EUROPEAN BRIEF 141-75.4

1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE SOCIALISTS APPEAR TO BE TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNISTS' RECENT SETBACKS, ALTHOUGH THEY REMAIN CONCERNED THAT THEIR GAINS COULD BE WIPED OUT BY AN ATTEMPT TO SEIZE POWER FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT.4

[REDACTED] THAT PRIME MINISTER - DESIGNATE AZEVEDO HAS AGREED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE SOCIALIST PROGRAM AND THAT THE NEW CABINET COULD BE ANNOUNCED AS EARLY AS TODAY. [REDACTED] THEY

TURNED DOWN AN OPPORTUNITY TO FORM A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT THE OTHER PARTIES CRITICIZING ON THE SIDELINES AT A TIME WHEN TOUGH DECISIONS ARE NECESSARY.4

THE SOCIALISTS CLAIM THAT THEY WILL BE GIVEN AT LEAST FIVE OF THE APPROXIMATELY 15 CABINET POSTS, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY HAVE REACHED THIS NUMBER BY INCLUDING INDEPENDENTS SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR CAUSE. ACCORDING TO THE SOCIALISTS' VERSION OF THE NEW CABINET, THE POPULAR DEMOCRATS-WHO FINISHED A RESPECTABLE SECOND TO THE SOCIALISTS IN THE ELECTIONS LAST APRIL-WILL RECEIVE TWO POSTS, AND THE COMMUNISTS WILL

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BE GIVEN AT LEAST ONE AND POSSIBLY TWO. THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT STILL REJECT SUCH A REDUCTION IN THEIR OWN ROLE UNLESS PRO-COMMUNIST MILITARY OFFICERS ARE ALSO PRESENT IN THE NEW LINEUP.4

THE SOCIALIST PARTY REPORTEDLY HOPES TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE WHILE THINGS ARE GOING ITS WAY SO AS TO GAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE SOCIALISTS' STRATEGY INCLUDES AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE THE MILITARY TO RETURN TO THE BARRACKS AND AN ATTEMPT TO DISARM THE VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS, INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS' PARAMILITARY APPARATUS—WHICH THEY CLAIM NUMBERS APPROXIMATELY 6,000 IN THE LISBON AREA. {SECRET}4

2. USSR: MOSCOW IS MISSING NO OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE REGISTERING ITS DISAPPROVAL OF THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT.4

ACCORDING TO WESTERN PRESS REPORTS, SOVIET OFFICIALS PLAN TO BOYCOTT THE WORKING SESSIONS OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI MILITARY GROUP IN GENEVA, WHICH ARE TO WORK OUT DETAILS FOR THE ACCORD'S IMPLEMENTATION. THIS WOULD BE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE SOVIETS' DISPLEASURE, FOLLOWING THEIR FAILURE TO ATTEND LAST WEEK'S SIGNING CEREMONIES.4

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MOSCOW'S NEWS MEDIA ARE STRESSING THAT THE AGREEMENT FAILED TO RESOLVE BASIC MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS AND HAS SERVED TO HEIGHTEN RATHER THAN REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE AREA. THE PRESS ON SEPTEMBER 7 FOR THE FIRST TIME CARRIED AN ARTICLE THAT CHARGES THAT THE ACCORD WAS REACHED OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE. IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO ATTACK THE CONFERENCE'S LEGITIMACY, PRAVDA NOTED THAT THE "NEGOTIATIONS HAD AN OBVIOUSLY SEPARATE CHARACTER," DESPITE EFFORTS TO GIVE IT THE "OUTWARD APPEARANCE" OF BEING WITHIN THE GENEVA CONTEXT. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY RESTATING MOSCOW'S STANDARD FORMULA FOR ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT—MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING ALL INTERESTED PARTIES—BUT DID NOT SPECIFY THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.4

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// ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE SOVIET COMMUNITY IN CAIRO HAS INITIATED A WORD-OF-MOUTH CAMPAIGN CRITICAL OF THE ACCORD.

[REDACTED] THAT EGYPTIAN COMMUNISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE JOINED IN THIS EFFORT AND ARE SAID TO HAVE BEGUN SPREADING CRITICISM AMONG THE PEOPLE. [REDACTED]

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ITS OPPOSITION ACTIVITY.//{SECRET}4

3. ROMANIA-CHINA: ROMANIA IS DEMONSTRATING ITS CONTINUING CLOSE TIES WITH PEKING, PERHAPS IN REACTION TO FRESH ASSAULTS ON THE CHINESE BY THE KREMLIN.4

ILIE VERDET, A MEMBER OF THE ROMANIAN POLITBURO AND PARTY SECRETARY FOR CADRE AFFAIRS, ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN PEKING ON FRIDAY AT THE HEAD OF THE HIGHEST LEVEL ROMANIAN DELEGATION THAT HAS VISITED CHINA SINCE PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU WAS THERE IN 1971. THE ROMANIANS ARE EN ROUTE HOME FROM NORTH VIETNAM'S 30TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS.4

IN PEKING, VERDET SPECIFICALLY PRAISED THE LEADERSHIP OF MAO TSE-TUNG AND EMPHASIZED THE GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ROMANIAN AND CHINESE PARTIES; BOTH SIDES PLEDGED TO EXPAND THEIR TIES. ON SUNDAY, VERDET MET WITH CHOU EN-LAI TO CONVEY CEAUSESCU'S PERSONAL GREETINGS AND BEST WISHES TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP.4

THE TIMING OF THE VISIT SUGGESTS THAT IT WAS A CALCULATED ACT OF DEFIANCE OF MOSCOW. IT COMES ON THE HEELS OF AN AUTHORITATIVE, VERY HARSH ATTACK ON CHINA AND ITS SUPPORTERS PUBLISHED IN THE

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SOVIET PARTY'S THEORETICAL JOURNAL, KOMMUNIST. INDEED, KOMMUNIST WARNED THAT THOSE WHO ARE NEUTRAL OR CONCILIATORY TOWARD MAO AND HIS POLICIES "OBJECTIVELY PROMOTE THE ANTI-MARXIST, ANTI-SOCIALIST AIMS OF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP."

VERDET'S PRESENCE IN CHINA PUTS MOSCOW ON NOTICE THAT ROMANIA CLEARLY INTENDS TO OPPOSE ANY CRITICISM OF THE CHINESE--OR ANY ATTEMPT TO READ THEM OUT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT--AT THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES.

IN THE PAST, CEAUSESCU HAS DEMONSTRATED A REMARKABLE ABILITY TO GAUGE THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE TO HIS DISPLAYS OF INDEPENDENCE. AFTER THE VERDET TRIP, HE MAY NOW PULL IN HIS HORNS AND, AT LEAST OVER THE SHORT RUN, BECOME MORE ACCOMMODATING TOWARD MOSCOW--BUT WITHOUT COMPROMISING WHAT HE REGARDS AS THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMANIA'S INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE WARSAW PACT. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.H

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 891-75

1. COLOMBIA: THE ASSASSINATION ON SEPTEMBER 8 OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES RINCON WAS APPARENTLY THE WORK OF THE PRO-HAVANA NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY. ALTHOUGH RINCON WAS A STAFF OFFICER, HE PREVIOUSLY HEADED THE BRIGADE MOST INVOLVED IN CONTAINING THE GROUP'S RURAL GUERRILLAS. (UNCLASSIFIED)4

2. ARGENTINA: RESPONDING TO AN UNPRECEDENTED UPSURGE IN LEFT-WING VIOLENCE AND KIDNAPINGS, PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON HAS FORMALLY OUTLAWED THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION AS THE FIRST STEP IN WHAT MAY BECOME A MAJOR OFFENSIVE AGAINST ALL ARGENTINE TERRORISTS.4

THE MONTONEROS SUPPORTED THE RETURN OF JUAN PERON FROM EXILE IN 1973, BUT DECLARED "WAR" AGAINST HIS WIDOW IN SEPTEMBER 1974. THE GOVERNMENT HAD AVOIDED TAKING OFFICIAL ACTION AGAINST THEM FOR FEAR OF ANTAGONIZING THOSE PERONISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ALIENATED BY THE CONSERVATIVE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION. THE MONTONEROS HAVE PLAYED AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ROLE THROUGH AGITATION WITHIN THE PERONIST LABOR MOVEMENT AND EVEN FIELDED CANDIDATES UNDER THE BANNER

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OF THE AUTHENTIC PARTY IN A RECENT PROVINCIAL ELECTION.4

THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOW GIVEN SECURITY FORCES CONSIDERABLE LATITUDE IN CONDUCTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. UNTIL NOW, SYMPATHETIC NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS COULD FORCE THE RELEASE OF MONTONEROS HELD WITHOUT CHARGE BY PUBLICIZING THEIR NAMES. SUCH ACTIONS IN BEHALF OF OUTLAWED GROUPS ARE NOW FORBIDDEN.4

ADDITIONAL MEASURES ARE LIKELY TO BE ANNOUNCED SOON. THE NEW ARMY COMMANDER, GENERAL JORGE WIDELA, HAS TOLD NEWSMEN THAT THE ARMY'S ANTI-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN TUCUMAN PROVINCE, LARGELY AGAINST THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY, COULD BE EXTENDED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY "IF THE CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED." HE ADDED THAT A FEDERAL ORGANIZATION MAY BE FORMED TO COORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF ALL SECURITY FORCES.4

THE MONTONEROS AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY WOULD LIKE TO GOAD THE ARMED FORCES LEADERS INTO OUSTING THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH THEY REGARD AS INSUFFICIENTLY RADICAL. THEY EXPECT THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD PRODUCE POPULAR REVULSION AGAINST THE MILITARY AND ASSURE AN EVENTUAL LEFT-WING VICTORY. IN PURSUIT OF THIS LONG-RANGE GOAL, THE

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SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN FORCING THEIR TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ALL BRANCHES OF THE ARMED FORCES.

ARGENTINE SOCIETY IS BEING BATTERED BY THE TWIN ASSAULTS OF ECONOMIC DETERIORATION AND MOUNTING VIOLENCE, WHICH FEED ON EACH OTHER AND COULD OVER TIME BRING ABOUT THE POLITICAL POLARIZATION THE EXTREMISTS SEEK. (UNCLASSIFIED) E-2 IMPDET.

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